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 4 
Abstract 
 
In the age of digitalisation and information overflow, it might be difficult for people to 
decide which information to consume and trust. However, next to all of that, we still have 
to make important decisions and one of them taking part in elections.  
In recent years, Voting Advice Applications or VAAs, as they are usually abbreviated, 
have become increasingly popular among voters in many countries. It is not an 
exaggeration to say that they are now the real part of how a voter makes his or her voting 
decision. The typical reason for this tends to be the fact that using VAA is rational for a 
voter: s/he gets the information from one place, and what is even more important, based 
on his or her opinions on certain matters, the program matches and also compares voter’s 
views to the ones of political party or candidate.  
Yet, quite little is known about the impact of VAAs. The aim of my master thesis is to 
contribute to the investigation of VAAs and have a look at their impact on Estonian 
voters’ voting behaviour. To do so, I will be using two datasets: panel data from European 
Parliament elections in 2014 and survey data on Estonian national elections in 2015. It is 
worth noting that in Estonia’s case panel data has not studied before in order to see the 
possible effect of VAAs on voting behaviour.  
I will pose three questions in my thesis: how do VAAs influence voting turnout, how do 
they change voter’s choice set, and finally, if VAAs have any effect on final vote choice.  
From statistical point of view, the results of my analysis are mostly insignificant. Leaving 
this aside, I found that based on those two datasets VAAs act more like a control 
mechanism: those people who already have decided to go to vote also tend to use VAA, 
also there is mostly no change in their choice set. One reason for this can be found from 
so called bottleneck theory – people who are more exposed to information, internet usage 
and different possibilities are therefore also less affected by VAA as it is one competing 
information source. From the other hand, those people, who are more likely to be affected 
by VAA, are not exposed to it and therefore I could not see effect of it on voting 
behaviour.  
In terms of final vote choice, I noticed that those people who used VAA were also more 
likely to change their final vote choice. However, as it was statistically insignificant, I 
cannot say that it translates to the whole population.  
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Introduction  
 
The ways how we form our political preferences and why we change them has been a 
compelling topic for researches for a long time. This comes mostly down to the fact that 
there are many variables that play the role in shaping our voting behaviour. 
As the time has moved on, the variety of information that people can consume and have 
access to has become enormous. We may read print media, watch TV debates, scroll 
through and read social media and discuss politics with friends and family. This, of 
course, is not a final list and getting information and forming knowledge is way bigger 
and more complicated process.  
However, surviving in this mix of information might not be easy. As we think about one 
of the main citizen duties, participating in elections, the decision who to vote for might 
not come so easily for people. Already in 1980s, political scientists decided to give a 
helping hand to voters and came out with a simple paper and pencil test that later formed 
into Voting Advice Application or VAA, as it is usually abbreviated. In short, it is a 
helping tool for people to see what political party or candidate matches the most with his 
or her political stances. The results are presented usually on the basis of a simple and 
usually quite quick test.  
VAAs have become a real part of political decision making for many people. From the 
perspective of academia, the most common explanation for this has been explaining it 
through comparison of the cost and utility of taking VAA and going voting. Simply put, 
if the effort one has to give is smaller than the utility what voter might get from voting 
for a party or candidate, s/he goes to vote. In this case, VAAs are helpful tools as they 
help to decrease the amount of time one has to take to search and compare stances of 
political parties or candidates. 
Voting Advice Applications are also widely understood as competing information 
sources. That means that VAA is only one possible medium of getting information on 
political parties or candidates and their views. However, compared to for example news 
papers or TV shows, VAA gives comparative information and has gathered and created 
a list of all participating parties or candidates and their views.  
Other possible option of understanding the effect of VAAs on voting behaviour, is for 
example issue voting. Issue voting may be referred more to making the final vote choice 
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in the voting booth (or in Estonia’s case also at home, work, school or forest). VAAs 
inform people on certain matters and a voter finds out that some other party or candidate 
stands closer to him or her in such questions that matter the most for the voter.  
In general, scholars have agreed that VAAs have an impact on voters’ voting behaviour, 
however, much is yet to discover. The aim of this master thesis is to analyse, whether and 
how VAAs influence voters’ party and policy preferences.  
In this thesis I am going to answer the research questions based on two datasets. The first 
one being panel data on European Parliament elections in 2014 and the second one survey 
data on Estonian national elections in 2015.  
The novelty of my research is that panel data has not tested before to test the effect of 
VAAs on Estonian voters.   
Voting behaviour as such, however, is a very large topic. For my theses I have narrowed 
it down to three main questions: how do VAAs influence turnout; how do VAAs influence 
voter’s choice set; how do VAAs influence final vote choice.  
My thesis will be divided into three main parts: theoretical part when I briefly introduce 
the concept and also history of VAAs, then I will continue with theoretical framework on 
how VAAs affect voting behaviour; the second section will be devoted to analysis; third 
and final section will be about results, summary and conclusion.  
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Theory of VAA usage  
 
To have a look at more thorough insight to the VAAs and their effect on voting behaviour, 
it would be suitable to have a look at what VAAs are. Also, in this section I will give a 
brief overview of the history of VAAs that reaches back into 1980s when the first, so 
called offline version of VAA was issued. However, as can be seen below, VAAs were 
not as intriguing to voters before they found their new home on the Internet. After that, 
millions of people started using VAAs and now in some countries they seem to be almost 
like a ‘real part’ of the voting behaviour. As Dinas et al (2014: 2) note, “citizens start 
using these tools repeatedly, and on a structural basis, before elections. In a way, for a 
growing part of the electorate these tools have become fully embedded elements of the 
electoral process”. 
What are VAAs? 
As several authors (Marschall and Garzia, 2014; Gemenis 2014, to name few) who study 
VAAs have noted, the age of Internet and wider digitalisation have also had an impact on 
voting behaviour and the way people gather information. “The more people have used 
the net for their political communication and for collection of information, the larger the 
potential VAA user-group has become” (Marschall and Garzia 2014: 4). 
In addition to traditional media sources like television, radio, newspapers, we also have 
social media, web forums etc. However, more widely, especially during the last decade, 
an additional source has been emerging, namely Voting Advice Applications or simply 
VAAs.  
As Marschall and Garzia (2014: 1) write, VAAs are applications that “assist voters in the 
electoral decision by comparing their policy preferences with the programmatic stances 
of political parties and/or candidates”. Israel et al (2014: 56-57) add that “VAAs are issue-
based tools as they provide only information on the different programmatic positions of 
the parties running for elections, and their proximity to the voters’ policy positions 
decides which party is “recommended” to the user”.  
As electoral campaigning is to a very large extent done also online, VAAs have gained 
importance in the whole electoral campaigning time and process as more and more people 
are using VAAs (Garzia and Marschall 2012).  
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Marschall and Garzia (2014: 1-2) write that in some countries like Netherlands (VAA 
named Stemwijzer) or Germany (Wahl-O-Mat) VAAs have become very popular and 
millions of voters are using them during the election time.  
Brief history of VAAs 
VAAs are rather new phenomena and they started taking more ground as they were 
digitalised. Namely, as Gemenis (2014: 1) notes, VAAs already reach back to 1980s, in 
a form of simple pencil and paper tests. At that time, they were not very compelling and 
interesting for voters to use. Marschall and Garzia (2014: 2) call it the “offline” period of 
VAAs.  
According to Marschall and Garzia (2014: 2) StemWijzer is the ‘ancestor’ of all VAAs. 
It was “developed in 1989 by the Dutch Stichting Burgerschapskunde in collaboration 
with the Documentatiecentrum Nederlanse Politieke Partijen and the faculty of Political 
Management at the University of Twente”. At that time, VAA was only a “small booklet 
with 60 statements taken from political party manifestos and a diskette” (ibid.). A digital 
version of StemWijzer was released a few years later for the 1998 parliamentary elections. 
Using VAA started to become more and more popular among Dutch voters (ibid.).  
Garzia and Marschall (2012: 205), mention that “except for a few cases, nearly all of the 
tools have been established after 2000”. By few cases they mean Finland and Netherlands. 
However, as VAAs took digital form, people started using them more and more. Marshall 
(2014) writes that VAAs have become an important part in many European countries as 
they are popular. Gemenis (2014: 2) says that “usage figures exceeding one quarter of the 
electorate in Belgium, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland”.  
In this case, one has to mention that VAAs have not only been used exclusively on 
national level. Before the EU elections of 2009, a supranational VAA was launched under 
the auspices of the Florence-based European University Institute (Marschall and Garzia 
2014: 2). “In only six weeks, the EU Profiler was able to attract more than 2.5 million 
users from all around the continent” (ibid.). Another tool, VoteMatch Europe was offered 
for the same elections. For the European Elections of 2014, “several initiatives have been 
launched offering national as well transnational Voting Advice Applications throughout 
Europe” (ibid.). 
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VAAs in Estonia and abroad 
VAAs in Europe have had almost like a snowball effect. They were first used in 
Netherlands, then they started emerging in other countries as well as it was seen that they 
are useful and also popular among people.  
In this section I have already mentioned that among Germans, using VAA is also popular 
(Wahl-O-Mat). However, VAAs have been created also in Bulgaria (Glasovoditel), 
Switzerland (Politarena), Belgium (in 2004 Flemish public broadcaster VRT issued Doe 
de Stem Test! for the regional elections held that year). An example closer to Estonia 
would be Finland, that developed the first VAA already in 1996 (Marschall and Garzia 
2014: 2). For 1999 European Parliament elections, Helsingin Sanomat developed also a 
VAA (ibid.). According to Ruusuvirta (2010, from Marshall and Garzia 2012:1), more 
than 20 applications were available for Finnish voters. According to Marschall and Garzia 
(2014), VAAs are also available in Belgium, France, Portugal, Sweden, Turkey, and also 
Arabian and South American countries, which means that their scope has become really 
wide.  
This thesis, however, is about Estonia. Voting Advice Applications have been used by 
Estonian voters already from 2009, when the EU Profiler was created for the European 
Parliament elections. However, as Vassil (2011: 140) writes, the popularity of it was quite 
low as it was used only 1627 times during the availability of it. The second VAA, “EU 
and I” was also available in Estonia. In this thesis I am going to analyse how VAAs 
www.euandi.err.ee and www.euvowx2014.eu influenced voting behaviour.   
Much bigger numbers, however, wait for us when we have a look at following VAAs. 
First Valijakompass was issued in 2011 for national elections and the second 
Valijakompass for 2015 elections. The latter has been used over 100 000 times1. In 2015 
there was also another VAA, called Valimismootor, developed by non-profit organisation 
MTÜ Valimisvaatlus2.  
How do VAAs work? 
Even though the form of VAAs might be a bit different, the basics of the functioning of 
a VAA are quite the same. Garzia et al (2014) note that “VAAs share a common 
                                                   
1 See on: http://valijakompass.dev.err.ee/  
2 See on: http://www.delfi.ee/news/riigikogu2015/mootor/  
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underlying principle: they help users casting a vote by comparing their policy preferences 
on major issues with the programmatic stances of political parties on the same issues”.  
 
 
Picture 1. Example of question in VAA. It states: Estonian economy should grow before 
we can start increasing the well-being of people. Below, six variants of answers (from 
left): complete agreement, quite agree, neutral, not quite agree, complete disagreement, 
no opinion.  
  
In order to make sure voter’s political preferences and match with party (or in some cases 
candidate) voter shows his/her agreement or disagreement with a political statement. The 
exact number of issues or statements varies from one VAA to another but usually it is 
between 10 and 70. Marschall and Garzia (2014: 1) give some examples of statements: 
“social programmes should be maintained even at the cost of higher taxes” or “abortion 
should be forbidden”.  
After the voter has marked his/her opinion about given issues, the choices are matched 
with positions of political parties/candidates. Eventually voter can see the so called match 
list and have a look at what kind of political parties/candidates stand close to him/her. 
Some other graphical representations exist, as well (Garzia et al 2014: 26; Marschall and 
Garzia 2014: 1). For that, see Picture 2 below.  
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Picture 2. Graphic representation of the results of VAA. Source: Ladner and Pianzola, 
2010. 
 
The way how VAAs are created is not the centric issue of this thesis, however, one can 
say that there are some variations for example in response categories. For example, 
Stemwijzer was using only very simplistic categories of agreement or disagreement, i.e. 
‘yes’ and ‘no’, plus a neutral option (Marschall and Garzia 2014: 2). However, for 
example in Estonia’s Valijakompass case, users could evaluate on a six step scale, from 
complete agreement to complete disagreement and no opinion choice (see Picture 1 
above). Same categorization was used for Valimismootor3.  
Who are using VAAs? 
Even though VAAs are becoming more and more widespread and there are no exact 
groups who are especially using them, it is still claimed that there are certain groups who 
are more exposed to using VAAs (Wall et al 2009: 6). The main reason for that is that 
people are experiencing, adapting to and using technology differently. As Wall et al 
(2009: 20) note, “if VAAs do influence voting behaviour, this influence is unlikely to be 
spread evenly across the population”. 
Therefore, from the perspective of this thesis, it is also relevant to have a look at who the 
most common users of VAAs are.  
                                                   
3 See on: http://www.delfi.ee/news/riigikogu2015/mootor/  
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Several researches have tackled that question and it turns out that VAAs are most 
commonly used by young, men, and more educated people who are also interested in 
politics (Wall et al 2009; Hirzalla, Zoonen and Ridder 2010; Vassil 2011).  
As noted above, Hirzalla, Zoonen and Ridder (2010) have found that using Internet 
mobilizes voters and therefore the effect of VAAs can be seen best on young generation. 
This can be also supported by the study by Pianzola et al (2012) who investigated the 
effect of VAAs among Swiss university students in 2011. As one of the weak points is 
that the sample is not representing the whole Swiss society, I claim that it is an excellent 
way of showing how VAAs affect young people. As it can be assumed that the majority 
of those who took part in the study were belonging to young generation they found that 
after using VAA they were more open to voting alternatives and therefore claimed that 
they considered more possible opportunities who to vote for. Also Vassil (2011) has 
found that VAAs are more likely to change young people’s vote intention.  
When it comes to gender then Van de Pol et al (2014) write that researches have found 
that men are more likely to use VAA. This most probably comes down to the interest in 
technology and using it.  
Van de Pol et al (2014: 6) also mention that using VAA is also more common among 
those people who are interested in politics, which means that they are already engaged 
into politics. As they write, “politically interested citizens will follow political news more 
closely, and will therefore be the first to notice the availability of a VAA” (ibid.). That 
means that they are also prone to use it, and those people who are not interested in politics, 
may even not know about the existence of VAA.  
Finally, VAAs are more used among more educated people (Van de Pol et al 2014). This 
most probably comes down to the fact that educated people tend to be also more interested 
in politics and therefore they are “overrepresented among the users” (Van de Pol et al 
2014: 9).  
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VAAs influencing voting behaviour. Research questions 
 
The next section focuses on how VAAs are claimed to impact voters’ voting behaviour. 
There are several theoretical approaches that can be considered in order to analyse voting 
behaviour. In this section I will give an overview of rational choice theory, representative 
deficit, VAAs as communicative tool, and issue voting. In this part I will also give an 
overview of hypotheses of this research.   
Rational choice theory 
Rational choice theory takes cost and utility into consideration. That means that a person 
compares the cost of going voting (for example gathering information to make a vote 
choice; also transportation and time go under this category), and the utility or the benefits 
of it. As Garzia and Trechsel (2017: 3) put it, the main idea of this theory is that the 
“individual-level probability to cast a vote is inversely proportional to the effort required 
to gather information”. This can be also described in two equations: 𝑝𝑈 < 𝐶 𝑝𝑈 > 𝐶, 
Where p is probability of casting the decisive vote, U is utility, and C is cost.  
The equation above says that the probability of casting the decisive vote times utility (U) 
is smaller than the cost (C) of casting a vote. If so, then according to rational theory, a 
voter should not go and vote. If the probability of casting a decisive vote times utility is 
bigger than the cost, then according to rational choice theory, a voter should go and cast 
a vote as it is beneficial for her. This situation is depicted in the equation above.  
Alvarez, Levin, Trechsel and Vassil (2014) have marked that the cost effect is the one 
that actually makes people use VAAs and explains the success of VAAs among voters. 
This can be explained through Garzia and Trechsel (2017: 2) who note that VAAs 
“provide customized political information”. That means that a person does not have to 
rank parties or candidates for himself/herself, it has already been done for him/her. “For 
rational voters, therefore, the benefit from voting had to outweigh the costs for taking part 
in the collective decision at the polls” (Garzia and Trechsel 2017: 2). Or as Marschall and 
Schultze (2012) put it, as VAAs provide comparison of different electoral alternatives 
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and from the perspective of cost this information is ‘cheap’, VAAs should boost turnout. 
From that I can form the first hypothesis of this research:  
H1: As the cost with using VAA decreases, VAAs should increase turnout. 
 
Representative deficit 
Some researches (for example Dinas et al 2014) have pointed also to the fact that VAAs 
might also have counter-effect, i.e. people may abstain from voting. This was studied 
through the effect of representative deficit.  
Representative deficit means a degree to what extent party or candidate represents voter’s 
opinions or in larger terms, world view. In simplified terms it means that if a person is a 
supporter of, say, Reform Party, and according to the results of VAA, the match between 
the voter’s and the party’s stances of given questions is 70%, then the representative 
deficit is 30% (100%-70%=30%). That means that almost one third of user’s views do 
not match with the ones of Reform Party.  
Dinas et al (2014: 9) write that “the lower the deficit, the stronger the self-persuasion, the 
higher the probability of “switching” party preference to the number one party in the 
match list”. Also, a psychological effect of going voting can be added here: if the 
representative deficit is small or low, it may make a person go and vote as s/he sees that 
there is one party that matches his/her views.  
However, Dinas et al (2014) have found the opposite effect as well. That means that the 
bigger the representative deficit, the bigger is the opportunity to abstain from voting. As 
noted above, that can again be connected to psychological effect This means that a person 
has no psychological or emotional security that s/he should go and vote because either 
s/he doesn’t feel closeness to any party/candidate or the results from VAA were so 
confusing that s/he is not sure in the previous decision anymore. Or as Dinas et all (2014: 
20) conclude, “the more isolated users realize they are in their political system, the more 
likely they are to report their intention to abstain because of this outcome”.  
H2: As VAAs show the extent of representative deficit, it is also likely that VAAs 
decrease the turnout. 
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VAAs as communicative tool 
In terms of voting behaviour, VAAs can be most probably best described as 
communicative aspects as in addition to all other possible information sources like print 
media, television, TV debates, social media, political party websites and statutes etc.  
In this case, VAAs are part of political communication and “only one among many 
competing information sources available to voters during campaign” (Garzia et al 2014: 
34). As noted in previous sections, Internet was the main tool that made VAAs available 
and also more interesting for wider audience. As Hirzalla, Zoonen and Ridder (2010) 
have written, using Internet mobilizes voters. Their research showed that especially on 
young generation. Even more, as Ladner, Fivaz and Pianzola (2012) have found, people 
tend to remember what the VAA suggested and it again increases the likelihood that the 
VAA has an impact on final vote choice. Vassil (2011) has elaborated on that and finds 
in his doctoral thesis “that VAAs indeed influence users’ political preferences, vote 
choice and motivate voters to participate in elections”.  
Also, Pianzola et al (2012) have found based on their research among Swiss university 
students during the 2011 Swiss federal elections that those who used VAA and therefore 
“were exposed to detailed information about vote alternatives, seem to incline voters to 
consider these alternative options more closely and include the closest ones as part of 
their future choice set”.  
As an aspect of information, Walgrave et al (2008) have claimed that VAAs actually help 
to draw voters’ attention to those parties that have been either not having that much 
attention in public or just broaden voter’s knowledge base in the means of political parties 
that have similar views to him/her. Eventually, that may mean that the voter changes 
his/her vote in the future.  
Researches have shown that the change in voting preferences can be even larger as the 
choice that the voter can do is not only between political parties but also candidates 
(Enyedi 2016: 3). He brings example from Switzerland where 15% of respondents 
claimed that they voted exactly how VAA responded. In Finland, 7% cent of the 
respondents in 2003 and 19 per cent in 2007 said that VAAs had an impact on their voting 
choice, even more, 15% said that they based their electoral choice only on VAAs 
(Ruusuvirta, 2010; from Enyedi 2016).  
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However, one crucial point that needs to be brought out is that even though VAAs are 
information sources and therefore have the power to change people’s opinions on one or 
another party or candidate, it is necessary to point out that it is not sure to what direction 
voter’s voting opinion or preference is changed. That means that the support to the party 
s/he planned to vote can even increase, however, it can also mean that the choice set can 
change a lot after using VAA. This is also the basis of the third hypotheses in this theses.  
H3: As VAAs are competing information sources and give people comparative 
information on political parties and candidates in one place, using VAA changes 
voter’s choice set 
 
Issue voting 
Somewhat similar to rational choice would be a phenomenon of issue voting. “Issue 
voting refers to the assumption that vote choice is determined by the individual voter’s 
proximity or distance to or from the position of the parties on salient issues” (Downs 
1957; from Marschall and Garzia 2014: 5).  
From here, to get the information to decide on the proximity of a party, we need some 
information. However, getting information comes with a cost, for example we need to 
give effort and take time to read on parties’ or candidates’ views on certain issues. VAAs, 
however, provide already ready information on timely issues, which means that the 
person needs to spend less time on finding and analysing information (Marschall and 
Garzia 2014). VAAs do it for him/her. Wall et al (2012: 4) note that VAAs “purport to 
substantially reduce the cognitive cost needed for a voter to engage in informed issue 
voting, which can be prohibitively costly due to the time and effort required”. They add 
that “this cognitive price tag” is especially crucial when it comes to countries, which have 
fragmented party systems a lot of candidates to choose from.  
That means that a person might change the final vote choice as s/he finds that some other 
party might stand closer to him/her on certain topics that the voter finds very important.  
H4: voter’s final vote choice is more likely to change if the voter used VAA. 
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Overview of the data and method 
This section gives an overview of the data used for this research, also it provides more 
close overview of the centric research questions tackled in this thesis.  
Overview of data 
For the analysis I am going to use two datasets, panel data on European Parliament 
elections from 2014 and survey data on Estonian national elections from 2015.  
 
Tables 1-2. Distribution of respondents included into this research. 
Panel data 
  Using VAA Not using VAA 
Going to vote 94 (76,4%) 604 (68,9%) 
Not going to vote 29 (23,6%) 272 (31,1%) 
Total 123 876 
   
Survey data 
  Using VAA Not using VAA 
Going to vote 122 (91,1%) 688 (79,5%) 
Not going to vote 9 (6,9%) 178 (20,5%) 
Total 131 866 
 
Overview of the panel data 
The panel data I am going to use is gathered by the researchers of Tartu University Johan 
Skytte Institute of Political Studies Mihkel Solvak and Kristjan Vassil in collaboration 
with survey centre Turu-uuringute AS.  
The panel data was gathered in two waves: the first round was done before the elections, 
the second one after the elections. For the research phone interviews were conducted. 
There were 1500 respondents in the first wave and 1002 in the second one. In the second 
wave 123 people (12,3% of respondents) claimed that they had used VAA, 876 (87,7%) 
people claimed that they did not use VAA.  
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As it is written below, four groups of respondents are formed in order to answer the 
research questions: respondents who went to vote and used VAA; respondents who went 
to vote and did not use VAA; respondents who did not go to vote and used VAA; 
respondents who did not go to vote and also did not use VAA (see Table 1).  
There were 94 (74,4% of VAA users) respondents who claimed that they used the VAA 
and also went to vote. There were 29 (23,6% of VAA users) respondents who said that 
s/he used VAA and did not go to vote. There were 604 (68,9% of those respondents who 
did not use VAA) respondents who did not use VAA and went to vote. And there 272 
respondents (31,1%) who did not use VAA and also did not go to vote.  
This means that out of 1002 people 123 claimed that they used VAA, which means that 
by and large every 10th person used VAA. The latter is comparable to the VAA usage in 
parliamentary elections: as there are over 900 000 eligible voters and over 100 000 had 
used VAA4.  
Overview of the survey data 
In the second part of the analysis, I will use survey data about Estonian national elections 
in 2015. There were 1007 respondents, out of whom 866 (86,9%) did not use VAA and 
131 (13,1%) did.  
As seen in Table 2 above, there were 122 respondents (93,1% of those who used VAA) 
who claimed that they both used VAA and also went to vote, and there were 9 people 
(6,9%) who used VAA and did not go to vote. There were 178 people (20,5% of those 
who did not use VAA) who said that they did not use VAA and also did not go to vote 
during 2015 national elections in Estonia. There were 688 respondents (86,9%) who did 
not use VAA but voted during elections.   
The data was collected by the survey company Saar Poll.  
Research method 
To find answers to the research questions that I have already mentioned above, I am going 
to use statistical analysis, using statistics programme Stata. Throughout the analysis I will 
use logistic regression, which means that I dichotomise several variables, for example 
using VAA (1-used; 0-did not use), planning to go and vote and actual behaviour, i.e. if 
a person went to vote or did not. Also, I will include gender, age, interest in politics, and 
                                                   
4 See on: http://valijakompass.dev.err.ee/  
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education into the analysis as control variables. The reasoning for that is, as noted in the 
theoretical part, that VAAs have been more commonly used by young, men, those who 
are interested in politics and have higher education. Namely, young people are more open 
to changing their political views as they are not completely formed yet, also younger 
people tend to be more exposed to technology. The latter is also the main factor among 
men. Those, who are more interested in politics tend to be also more prone to use VAAs, 
as they are more likely to find VAAs compared to those who are not.  
 
The next step will be having a more thorough look at research questions and the way I 
am going to tackle them.  
 
• Does using VAA influence voting turnout? 
At first, I am going to analyse how VAAs affect turnout. It is especially important in 
European Parliament elections as they are usually seen as less important and the turnout 
also reflects on that. This can be shown by comparing participation turnouts in 
parliamentary and European Parliament elections. In last European Parliament elections, 
the turnout was 36,5% (in 2004 28,6%, and in 2009 43,9%). In parliament elections the 
turnout has been around 62-65%, which is considerably higher.  
In order to analyse how VAAs impact turnout, I take planning to go to vote and actual 
voting behaviour into consideration. Then I will add using VAA into consideration to see 
the effect of VAAs. Control variables such as age, gender and interest in politics are also 
included.  
For this research question I will be using both, panel data on European Parliament 
elections and also survey data on national elections in Estonia in 2015.  
 
• Does using VAA change choice set? 
Using ‘choice set’ in this context is somewhat arbitrary. I will not measure to what extent 
one or another party’s position moved across the respondent’s choice set in first and 
second wave, I only measure if it changed. That means that I do not distinguish positive 
(the probability to vote for a party has increased) or negative (probability to vote for 
party/candidate has decreased) movements across the choice set. 
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Panel data provides information on the choice set of respondents (in questionnaire marked 
as “What is the probability that you give your vote to following political parties? Please 
evaluate it on the scale from 0-10 where 0 means that you would not give your vote to 
this party and 10 means that the probability that this party gets the vote is very high). 
Respondents could give their evaluations of voting for following political parties: Reform 
Party, Social Democrats, Centre Party, Pro Patria and Res Publica Union, and 
Conservatives (EKRE, Conservative People’s Party of Estonia).  
By comparing first and second wave responses and adding whether a person used VAA, 
it is possible to analyse the effect of VAA on choice set.  
One critical point that can be brought out here would be that people can also be influenced 
by other factors to change their vote preference (or leave the same). As the time gap 
between those two surveys was quite large, people could also gain information from 
media (newspapers, TV debates, social media etc).  
To eliminate this effect to some extent, I will be adding control variables age, gender and 
education. As seen in theory, those people who are more educated are also less prone to 
change their choice set as they are usually more informed and also interested in politics.  
To answer this research question I will use panel data on European Parliament elections.  
 
• Does using VAA influence final vote choice compared to the intentional one? 
As I enter initial and final vote choice into the regression model, I will be considering 
four possible combinations of using a VAA and whether a person went to vote.  
• Used VAA and went to vote 
• Used VAA and did not go to vote 
• Did not use VAA and went to vote 
• Did not use VAA and did not go to vote 
For this research question I will use panel data on European Parliament elections in 2014. 
I will add age as the control variable.  
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Empirical analysis and results 
In this section I will present the empirical analysis to answer research questions stated 
above.  
Descriptive statistics 
First, I will have a look at descriptive statistics to have an understanding of those people 
who used and not used VAAs. I will bring out the distribution of VAA users/non-users 
according to age and gender.  
Firstly, let us have a look at the distribution of VAA users according to age in two datasets 
(see Table 3). Firstly, it can be noted that more people have said that they did not use 
VAAs in order to see what political party or candidate is the closest to them.  
As I have a look at the distribution of VAA users across two datasets I can see that 
younger people are more prone to use VAA. This is also understandable and logical as 
young people tend to be more computer literate and therefore they are more prone to use 
VAAs.  
Considering those people who claimed that they did not use VAA, then it can be noted 
again that older people are more likely not to use VAA.  
 
Table 3. Age distribution according to VAA usage.   
  VAA 
   Used VAA Did not use VAA 
  Panel data Survey data Panel data Survey data 
18-24 11 (13,58%) 20 (22,99%) 70 (86,42%) 67 (77,01%) 
25-34 33 (17,55%) 30 (21,13%) 155 (82,45%) 112 (78,87%) 
35-44 24 (14,63%) 31 (17,71%) 140 (85,37%) 144 (82,29%) 
45-54 25 (13,59%) 24 (14,29%) 159 (86,41%) 144 (86,71%) 
55-64 14 (7,87%) 10 (6,10% 164 (92,13%) 154 (93,90%) 
65-74 
16 (7,84%) 
13 (7,69%) 
188 (92,16%) 
156 (92,31%) 
75+ 3 (3,26%) 89 (96,74%) 
N 123 131 876 866 
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If I have a look at the respondents according to gender, then I see that men are slightly 
more likely to use VAA than women. This also confirms what I have already mentioned 
above: it is necessary to include age and gender as control variables into this research.  
However, as seen in Table 4, across both datasets, not using VAA was heavily more 
represented than using VAA. 
 
Table 4. Gender distribution according to VAA usage.   
  VAA 
  Used VAA Did not use VAA 
  Panel data Survey data Panel data Survey data 
Male 60 (12,93%) 68 (15,42%) 404 (87,07%) 373 (84,58%) 
Female 63 (11,78%) 63 (11,33%) 472 (88,22%) 493 (88,67%) 
N 123 131 876  866 
 
 
VAA influencing turnout 
The first chapter focuses on analysing the impact of VAA on turnout. In this section I will 
examine if the VAAs through their communicative aspect make people go and cast their 
vote in elections.  
I will use panel data on European Parliament elections in 2014 and also survey data from 
2015 national elections in Estonia. In the first case I will have more broad range how I 
can approach to the question about the effect on turnout. For example, I can analyse 
planning to go to vote and actual behaviour separately and measure if VAA has some 
effect each or both of those variables.  
In national elections section, I will only try to find the connection between the voting 
behaviour, i.e. if a person did go to vote or not and the effect of VAA on that. I also 
compare the results of those two sections to see if there is any difference in the effect of 
VAAs between the types of two elections. That means that I try to find out if people are 
more prone to be affected by VAA when European Parliament or Estonian national 
elections take place.  
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As the main idea of this section is to have look at the effect of VAA on turnout, one can 
have a look at two possible options. Using VAA can make a person go and cast a vote in 
elections as it informs voter about possible choices and therefore helps make voting 
decision easier, which may be an important aspect in deciding to go and vote. As I analyse 
data on European Parliament elections, it is especially important because European 
Parliament is often referred as something that people do not feel close relationship with. 
Also, as I have already noted above, the turnout in European Parliament elections is 
considerably smaller than for instance in national elections.  
However, as I consider VAAs an informative tool that finds the closest match to the voter 
in terms of political parties or candidates, I can also note that using VAA can also cause 
further confusion and therefore it may hinder person from voting.  
Analysing panel data 
I will start by analysing the panel data. For the analysis I compose a table to have a look 
at how many people changed their intent to go voting in general. For that I have a look at 
how many people planned going voting and actually went to cast a vote. I will exclude 
those people who did not know about their preferences in one or both categories or did 
not want to answer questions regarding planning to vote and actual behaviour. 
 
Table 5. People changing their intent of going voting.  
  Went to vote   
Planned to vote 0 1 Total 
0 134 (92,41%) 11 (7,59%) 145 (100%) 
1 107 (14,08%) 653 (85,92%) 760 (100%) 
Total 241 (26,63%) 664 (73,37%) 905 (100%) 
 
 
In Table 5 I have recoded intention and real behaviour into dichotomous categories. 
Variable “planned to vote” marks if a person had an intention to go and cast a vote. 0 
marks that s/he did not have an intention to go and vote, 1 marks that a respondent said 
that s/he planned to go to vote.  
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Variable “went to vote” marks real behaviour, i.e. if a person went and casted a vote in 
elections. 1 marks that s/he did cast a vote, 0 that s/he did not cast a vote.  
All in all, I consider the answers from 905 people. As seen in Table 5, 118 people in total 
changed their preference. That means that they either planned to go and finally did not go 
or they did not plan to go but eventually still went to vote (in table 0:1; 1;0). From the 
same table, 787 people did as they had planned (in table 1:1; 0:0). So I can say that less 
people changed their behaviour.  
The next step would be to see if a VAA had a role to play in making that decision. I first 
test that by simply observing the data.  
 
Table 6. On the left: planning to vote and actual behaviour of people who used VAA 
(VAA=1). On the right: planning to vote and actual behaviour of people who did not use 
a VAA (VAA=0). 
VAA=1 VAA=0 
  Went to vote Total   Went to vote Total 
Planned 
to vote 0 1   
Planned 
to vote 0 1   
0 
8 
(88,89%) 
1 
(11,11%) 
9 
(100%) 0 
126 
(92,65%) 
10 
(7,35%) 
136 
(100%) 
1 
16 
(15,09%) 
90 
(84,91%) 
106 
(100%) 1 
91 
(13,98%) 
560 
(86,02%) 
651 
(100%) 
Total 
24 
(20,87%) 
91 
(79,13%) 
115 
(100%) Total 
217 
(27,57%) 
570 
(72,43%) 
787 
(100%) 
 
 
In Table 6 on the left there are 115 people who used VAA and also stated if they had an 
intention to go and vote and also if they eventually voted. As of those people who did not 
use VAA, 787 people responded that question.   
As I have a look at the tables above, I see that among those people who used a VAA only 
17 changed their behaviour (that is either not planning to vote but still going to vote or 
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vice versa). Among those who did not use VAA 101 people changed their mind. That 
means that changing the behaviour was more frequent among those who did not use VAA.  
In the following analysis I am going to see if VAAs have the effect on changing the plan 
to go to vote. For that I am going to create another variable called “planned to vote” for 
those people who claimed that they planned to go to vote in 2014 European Parliament 
Elections. To mark those people who did not have a plan to go to vote I will add variable 
“did not plan to vote”. From that, I will compare it to the actual behaviour, i.e. if a person 
went to vote or not. If the behaviour has changed, for example a person planned to vote 
but did not go to vote, it will be coded as 1 because the behaviour has changed. If the 
person planned to vote and did go to vote it is coded as 0 as the behaviour did not change. 
The coding logic is also presented in Table 7 below.  
 
Table 7. Changing the voting behaviour.   
Planned 
to vote 
 Actual 
behaviour 
Coded 
to 
Did not plan to 
vote 
 Actual 
behaviour 
Coded to  
1 0 1 0 1 1 
1 1 0 0 0 0 
 
Voting behaviour can be changed by many aspects. In addition to using VAA, also 
interest in politics is a remarkable aspect that can make people go and cast a vote or vice 
versa. In the following analysis in addition to see the effect of VAAs on changing voting 
behaviour I will also add age, gender, and interest politics as independent variables to see 
if they have an impact on the change in voting behaviour.  
I begin with analysing the effect of VAA, age, gender, and interest in politics for those 
people who planned to go to vote. Let us have a look if VAAs have the power to make 
people who planned to vote to abstain from voting, i.e. move into direction of not going 
to vote.  
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Table 8. Predicting change in intention to go and not to go voting. Average marginal 
effects.  
 M1 (Pr planned to vote) M2 (Pr did not plan to vote) 
 dy/dx P>|z| dy/dx P>|z| 
VAA -0,11 (0,03) 0,757 0,10 (0,81) 0,214 
Age -0,00 (0,00) 0,000 0,00 (0,00) 0,003 
Gender 0,00 (0,03) 0,912 -0,11 (0,50) 0,028 
Interest in politics   empty empty 
Somewhat interested 0,29 (0,30) 0,330   
A bit interested 0,85 (0,37) 0,029   
Not interested 0,14 (0,06) 0,036   
  N                                      755                                              131 
  Pseudo R2                          0,07                                             0,27 
 
As I look at Table 8, I can see that VAA has actually a negative effect, which means that 
as a person uses VAA, s/he is 11% less likely to change the plan of going voting. 
However, this is statistically insignificant and therefore I cannot claim that this effect 
translates to the whole population. More likely, it refers to as using VAA is having a 
negative effect on planning to go to vote. That means that as a person is already sure 
about going voting, VAA does not affect or confuse him/her so much that s/he actually 
makes a decision and does not go to vote.   
From other independent variables that I have included, age has a slightly negative effect 
(as the age increases, the likelihood of changing the initial idea of going voting falls by 
0,4%) and it is also statistically important (p=0,000). Gender has slightly positive effect, 
however, on that question it is statistically not important (p=0,912).  
Interest in politics is, however, worth noting if it comes to changing the initial plan of 
going voting towards not going voting. Among those who are not interested in politics, 
the likelihood of changing the initial plan of voting increases compared to those who are 
very interested in politics. Those categories are statistically quite significant if we leave 
category “a bit interested” or “somewhat interested” aside (p=0,330).  
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Now let us have a look at model 2 (M2), where the predictable variable is “not planning 
to vote”. Let’s have a look at if using VAA makes those people who did not plan to vote 
actually go and cast a vote.  
As it can be seen, VAA has a positive impact on changing the initial plan of not going 
voting (using an VAA increases the likelihood of changing the initial plan of not going 
voting to voting by 10%), however, it is statistically not important (p=0,214) and I cannot 
claim that it reflects the whole population.  
Age as a positive impact on changing the initial plan of going voting, however, the effect 
is very small. The likelihood increases only by 0,4%. It is statistically important, though 
(p=0,003). Gender has a negative effect, which means that women are 11% less likely to 
change their initial plan of voting. As with age, I can claim that it is by and large 
statistically important (p=0,028).  
Unfortunately, in that case there are too few examples to include in the analysis to see the 
effect of interest in politics and therefore that column is empty.  
One further option here would be looking the interaction between using VAA and interest 
in politics and its effect on having or not having the intention of going voting. However, 
as there are too few cases under each category in interest in politics section, it is not 
possible to test it on this dataset.   
 
Testing Estonian national elections data 
Compared to the previous section, I will have a look at the same research question again, 
but this time I test it on national elections data from 2015, i.e. during the last national 
elections in Estonia. For this, I only have survey data that I can use to measure and have 
a look if VAAs are having an effect on turnout, and on the contrary, if using VAA can be 
actually predicted by the voting behaviour, i.e. if the person voted or not. Later in this 
section I will also try out interaction, the one that we could not do because of the lack of 
cases in the panel data.  
Firstly, I will have a look how many people used VAA. In total there were 1007 people 
who answered that question and out of those 10 people did not want to answer or did not 
remember using VAA. I will exclude those 10 people from the analysis and continue only 
with those who claim that they had or had not used VAA. As in the section above, I will 
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dichotomise those answers and create new variable VAA, where 1 means that the person 
used VAA, and 0 means that the person did not use VAA.  
As seen in the very first part of the analysis, i.e. descriptive statistics, answers from 997 
people are considered, and out of those, 866 people or almost 87% claimed that they did 
not use VAA. 131 or 13% claimed that they had used VAA.  
Next, I will have a look, how many people had claimed that they voted in national 
elections in 2015. Again I consider the answers from 1007 people and out of those 817 
or 81% claimed that they had voted. 190 or 19% said that they did not vote. There were 
no people who said that they did not want to answer that question or they did not 
remember going or not going voting.  
As with the usage of VAA, we also dichotomise going voting and generate variable called 
“went to vote”.  
As seen in descriptive statistics part, 866 people did not use VAA and out of those, 688 
went to vote. There were 131 people total who used VAA and out of those vast majority 
also went to vote, i.e. 122 people (93%).  
The next step would be to have a look at the connection between going to vote and VAA. 
In Table 8 Model 1 (M1) helps us understand the effect of VAA to going voting. We can 
see that using VAA has a positive effect. It is also statistically significant (p=0,000). That 
means that if a person uses VAA, the likelihood that s/he goes to vote increases by 19%.  
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Table 9. Going to vote predicted. Average marginal effects.  
 M1  M2  
 dy/dx P>|z| dy/dx P>|z| 
VAA 0,19 (0,53) 0,000 0,16 (0,49) 0,002 
Age 
 
0,02 (0,01) 0,008 
Gender 0,03 (0,02) 0,184 
Interest in politics    
Somewhat interested -0,07 (0,02) 0,003 
A bit interested -0,20 (0,03) 0,000 
Not interested -0,39 (0,50) 0,000 
  N                                      997                                            986 
  Pseudo R2                        0,02                                           0,12 
 
 
As I did in the first part of this section, in addition to VAAs there are also a number of 
other possible variables that help predict if a person went to vote or not. Let us have a 
look at Table 9 model 2 (M2) where going voting is predicted by using VAA, and also 
age, gender, and interest in politics. In latter case, category “very interested” is used as a 
reference category. 
As it can be seen, VAA is still important in predicting if a person went to vote. The 
statistical significance has somewhat decreased (from p=0,000 above to p=0,002 here) 
but can be said is still significant. As I have a look at the effect of VAA, then if a person 
used VAA the probability to vote increased by almost 16%. Age and gender have also 
positive impact on going voting, however, it is very small and also they are statistically 
less significant compared to the effect of VAA.  
As I have a look at the interest in politics, the less interested a person is in politics the less 
probable it is that s/he goes to vote. In this case, “very interested is a reference category. 
Those people who are not interested in politics at all are 38% less probably going to vote 
than those who are very interested in politics. Also, as the interest in politics “decreases” 
the smaller the chance that person goes to vote. This is also logical and expected. 
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In addition to that, I can also have a look at the relationship between VAAs and turnout 
by trying out interaction. I will take going to vote as dependent variable. I will have a 
look at the interaction of VAA and interest in politics in going to vote.  
 
 
Graph 1. Interest in politics and using VAA in interaction to explain going voting.  
 
As I look at the Graph 1, both blue ja red line (not using and using VAA accordingly) 
have negative slope.  
Let us have a closer look at those people who used VAA (VAA=1). In this case negative 
slope can be seen, which means that among those people who used VAA, as the degree 
of interest in politics decreases, the smaller is the probability that a person went to vote. 
As VAA should be considered as a communicative tool and an application from where 
information comes in low cost, people who are not interested in politics at all should also 
according to theory be more prone to go voting. Furthermore, I can note that among those 
who are interested in politics and also use VAA, the probability to go to vote is high. This 
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may mean that people use VAAs only to reassure voting choice or they use it simply out 
of interest, but not as a tool that really affects their decision whether to go to vote or not.  
In wider context this can be interpreted as a classic example of bottleneck theory. Vassil 
and Weber (2011: 2) have used it in the context of mobilizing voters to use e-voting in 
Estonia, however, the same logic can be also presented in this case. If we think about e-
voting and using VAAs, the common trait they share is they they created through 
technology and in terms of voting they can be considered as advanced tools of voting or 
helping voting.  
Vassil and Weber (ibid.) continue that those people who are more interested in politics 
are “generally also more experienced with computers and the internet”. That means that 
they are more exposed to using VAA as they have information on them and can also find 
an access to it. So, putting that into the context of this research: those people who are not 
interested in technology are therefore in a way trapped: they do not have information 
about using VAA or they simply cannot do that. The probability for that is even bigger in 
the case of European Parliament elections as they are typically more overlooked by 
people.  
The result of all of it is that VAAs are used by people who are interested in politics and 
may already have a fixed opinion on who to vote for. To them, the mobilizing effect is 
smaller. From the other hand, those people who are not interested in politics and therefore 
should “need help” in deciding who to vote for and through that push them towards going 
voting, are trapped as they do not have an access to VAA or they do not even now about 
its existence. On the basis of my analysis I can claim that as European Parliament 
elections are less important for people, the bottleneck effect is even greater. 
The blue line marks respondents who did not use VAA (VAA=0). Again I see a negative 
slope, which means that among those who did not use VAA and who are less interested 
in politics, are also less likely to go to vote. This is logical and expected.  
Comparing two datasets 
The last section of the turnout part would be the comparison of two datasets. In this case 
I take “went to vote” as a dependent variable and VAA, age, gender, and interest in 
politics as independent variables.  
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The main reason for comparing two datasets is from one hand to see the effect of VAA 
on going voting but more importantly, is there any difference in what elections voters are 
participating in. As noted above, the turnout in European Parliament elections has so far 
been way smaller than in the national elections. 
 
Table 10. Comparing two datasets where “going to vote” is a dependent variable. 
Average marginal effects.  
 M1 (panel data) M2 (survey data) 
 dy/dx P>|z| dy/dx P>|z| 
VAA 0,07 (0,04) 0,141 0,16 (0,49) 0,002 
Age 0,01 (0,00) 0,000 0,02 (0,01) 0,008 
Gender 0,02 (0,02) 0,531 0,03 (0,02) 0,184 
Interest in politics      
Somewhat interested -0,02 (0,03) 0,589 -0,07 (0,03) 0,003 
A bit interested -0,17 (0,04) 0,000 -0,20 (0,03) 0,000 
Not interested -0,36 (0,06) 0,000 -0,39 (0,50) 0,000 
 
It can be seen that in both cases that using VAA has positive effect on going to vote, also 
in the case of Estonian national elections (M2, survey data) it is also statistically 
significant. That means that as people use VAA, the likelihood that they go to vote, 
increases. However, here in the case of panel data (M1) it is statistically insignificant 
(p=0,141).  
Age and gender also have positive impact on going to vote, however, the effect is very 
small (the older the people the more likely they are going to vote) and also not in all cases 
they are statistically significant.  
Interest in politics also offers comparable data and it can be seen that the tendency is the 
same: the less interested people are in politics, the less likely they are to go to vote. Those 
variables were also almost in all cases statistically significant (besides “somewhat 
interested” in M1).  
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What can be concluded here is that in both cases the effect of VAA usage is the same. 
However, in the case of survey data it can be considered as statistically significant, 
whereas in the case of panel data the finding is statistically insignificant. This can also be 
the point from where it is possible to draw conclusions on VAA usage and its effect on 
different types of elections.  
As it is already noted above, Estonians tend to care more about national elections. That 
means that they feel participating there is citizen duty and it is also reflected by the 
relatively high turnout. However, the case is almost vice versa in terms of European 
Parliament elections.  
When it comes to analysing the effect of VAAs on turnout, then in theory in both cases 
VAA should have a positive effect on it. Even more, as VAAs are communicative tools 
and using it takes little time and effort (rational choice theory), the mobilizing effect 
should be even bigger in the case of European Parliament elections as it offers all of the 
information in one place and should convince people relatively easily to go and cast a 
vote.  
However, the numbers in the table show different situation. In the case of national 
elections, the mobilizing effect can be seen, however, as the result of analysing panel data 
is statistically insignificant, it shows that the effect of VAA is not that strong.  
 
VAA influencing choice set  
The second chapter is about influencing the choice set of a voter. In this section I will 
examine if the voter has changed his/her party/candidate preferences based panel data on 
European Parliamentary elections in 2014.  
The term ‘choice set’ in this analysis is somewhat arbitrary. I only consider if the voter 
has changed her/his preference when s/he has also used VAA. That means that I will 
again use dichotomous categories where 1 marks if the voter has changed the positioning 
of the political party or candidate, and 0 marks if it has stayed the same. Also, in this case 
it is not important if the likelihood that the party/candidate gets her/his vote has increased 
or decreased.  
As already noted in the theoretical part, it is important to understand that daily we 
consume different kinds of information. We use social media, we read newspapers, watch 
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political debates on TV etc. That means that even if we test the effect of VAA, we cannot 
surely claim that this is the tool that actually helped move the likelihood of voting for 
party/candidate. Instead, based on the statistical analysis I can assess if the VAA has had 
an important role to play in political party/candidate preferences by measuring if the 
probability of voting for a party/candidate has changed.  
 
Testing the data 
Let us have a look at the panel data on European Parliament elections. In survey, people 
are asked, how possible is that they give their vote to following political parties: Pro Patria 
and Res Publica Union, Social Democratic Party, Reform Party Centre Party, and 
Conservative People’s Party of Estonia. Respondents assessed the likelihood on 10point 
scale.  
First, I will have a look at the relationship between the change in support for the Reform 
Party and using VAA. For that I generate variable reform. In both waves, respondents 
answer the question about the probability of giving the vote to one or other political party. 
I will subtract one wave’s answers from another. Then I dichotomise the reform variable 
and mark 1 if the probability has changed. I mark 0 if the person is giving the same 
number of points for the probability to vote for the party.  
Next, I will do a logistic regression where reform is dependent variable and VAA 
independent variable. I will do the same with other four political parties as well, Pro Patria 
and Res Publica Union, Social Democratic Party, Centre Party, and Conservative Party.  
After that, I add a number of independent variables such as gender, age, and education.  
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Table 11. VAA, gender, age, and education level predicting change in the probability to 
vote for the political party. Average marginal effects.  
  PPRPU 
Social 
Democrats 
Reform 
Party Centre Party Conservatives 
VAA 
-0,035 
(0,046) 
-0,035 
(0,045) 
-0,001 
(0,47) 
-0,019 
(0,048) 0,019 (0,054) 
Gender 
-0,008 
(0,031) 
-0,041 
(0,031) 
-0,036 
(0,031) 
-0,045 
(0,032) -0,050 (0,038) 
Age 
-0,002 
(0,000) 
-0,000 
(0,000) 
-0,003 
(0,000)*** 
-0,002 
(0,001)** 
-0,004 
(0,001)*** 
Education 
-0,004 
(0,007) 
0,003 
(0,007) 
-0,008 
(0,001) 
-0,004 
(0,007) -0,013 (0,001) 
N 949 881 919 930 644 
*P ≤ 0.05;     **    P ≤ 0.01;   *** P ≤ 0.001. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
Table 11 depicts the role of VAA in changing the probability to vote for a political party.  
In cases of Pro Patria and Res Publica Union, Social Democratic Party, Reform Party and 
Centre party, VAA plays a negative role, i.e. a person who is using VAA is actually not 
more prone to change the probability to vote for the party (remember, 1 marks the change 
in probability to vote for, 0 staying the same). The reason behind that might be that voters 
who are planning to vote for named political parties are more sure about their vote choice. 
Also, those who do not support those parties or are neutral, they do not change their views.  
In the case of Conservative Party, the likelihood of the change in the probability to vote 
for a political party increases. That means that those voters who have planned to vote for 
Conservatives are more prone to change the probability of voting for that party. However, 
as I consider increasing and decreasing of the probability as the same, I cannot say if the 
probability changes towards increasing or decreasing. None of those results is, however, 
statistically significant.  
Gender has negative impact in change of the probability to vote for a political party, age 
has only in the case of Social Democrats a positive effect. In cases of Reform Party, 
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Centre Party and Conservatives it has a negative effect. Also, in those cases age is also 
statistically important. That means that as the age increases, the less likely people are to 
change the evaluation of the probability to vote for a specific political party. This is also 
logical and expected.  
The last independent variable included into this particular analysis was education. As 
with almost all other variables, it is also statistically not significant. In the case of Social 
Democrats, the higher the education, the more prone is the voter to change the likelihood 
of giving his/her vote to Social Democrats. In cases of Pro Patria and Res Publica Union, 
Reform Party, Centre Party and Conservatives, the higher the education, the less likely it 
is that the person changes the probability to vote for that party. This, indeed, is also 
expected as for those people who have higher education, have also most probably more 
formed political views and opinions. Also, they might consume more media and 
information to have those views formed.  
One option would be to try out interaction between the independent variables, 
unfortunately I cannot do that as there are too few cases to include into each category and 
some categories are also empty according to Stata. 
 
VAA influencing final vote choice 
In the final section I will analyse the effect of VAAs on final vote choice. In this section 
I will use panel data as it provides information on before and after making the vote choice.  
I start by making clear how many people were answering the question on VAAs. In the 
second wave respondents are asked whether they used VAAs or not. From the perspective 
of the following analysis I will exclude those respondents who claimed that they did not 
know if they used VAA or not. As in the second wave I have 1002 respondents and 3 of 
them said “I do not know”, I am left with 999 respondents.  
The next step would be comparing the voters’ voting choices. In the first wave, 
respondents were asked which candidate or political party the respondent plans to vote 
for. In second wave their actual vote choice was asked. Making sure if the person has 
changed his/her voting choice, the easiest way is to subtract the second response from the 
first one. For that I create a variable called “vote intention”. As above, in this case I will 
also exclude those candidates/parties that were mentioned in the first wave and not the 
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second, also, I will exclude those respondents who did not know or did not want to say 
either their first or final vote choice. Eventually there are 370 cases left, where 320 
respondents or 86,5% voted for the same party they intended to, and in the case of 50 
respondents or 13,5% vote intention and final vote choice did not overlap.  
Voting preference explained 
From here I can create a basic logistic regression model where “vote intention” is the 
dependent variable. I can create three models that help us understand the effect of VAAs.  
The first model would be simply to have a look at, whether VAAs can affect changing 
voting intention. The explanatory power of Model 1 (see M1 in Table 12 below) is 
however basically non-existing. VAAs have the positive effect on changing intention. 
However, it is statistically not important (p=0,090), which means that based on that it is 
not possible to make any further conclusions on how VAAs influence vote choice.  
However, in that regression model only one independent variable used, which means that 
all respondents were treated as a one homogeneous group. One possible way to dig deeper 
into this research question would be adding another variable. In this case I can use 
respondents’ age (see M2 in Table 12). It can be seen that compared to M1 the effect of 
VAAs to voting preference slightly decreased, however, it is still a positive effect. Age, 
on the contrary has negative effect on changing the vote choice, which means that if 
people get older, they are less likely to change voting preference. This is also expected as 
young people usually do not have already formed and fixed political preferences. As in 
M1, none of those independent variables is, however, statistically significant. Also, the 
explanatory power of M2 is very low.  
Next option would be to see the effect on changing voting preference by looking the effect 
of VAAs and also age groups. In model 3 (see M3 in Table 12) I can see that the effect 
of VAAs is almost the same as in M2, and it is also again statistically insignificant. 
However, as I have a look at the effect of age in changing voting preference, then model 
3 clearly opens that picture up more. In M2 I saw that the older people get the less likely 
they are to change voting intention. In M3 we see that comparing to 18-24 year olds 
(reference group), those people who belong to groups 35-44 and 65+ are less likely to 
change it. This is, in fact surprising as it would have been expected to be so in last two 
age categories. As with M1 and M2, also in M3 neither of the independent variables is 
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statistically significant. Also, in M3, the explanatory power of the model is almost non-
existent.  
 
Table 12. Predicting the voting preference. Average marginal effects.  
 M1 M2 M3 
Const. -1,96 (0,17) -1,27 (0,50) -1,93 (0,77) 
VAA 0,64 (0,38) 0,54 (0,39) 0,55 (0,40) 
Age 
 
-0,01 (0,01)  
18-24 
 
 
25-34 0,48 (0,83) 
35-44 -0,34 (0,90) 
45-54 0,51 (0,84) 
55-64 0,32 (0,82) 
65+ -0,73 (0,86) 
N 368 368 368 
Pseudo R2 0,009 0,016 0,036 
*P ≤ 0.05;     **    P ≤ 0.01;   *** P ≤ 0.001. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
Another possible option to analyse this questions is to look at the variables from the 
perspective of interaction. This means that it is always not sufficient to look at dependent 
and independent variables but also look at how independent variables interact, i.e. are 
connected to each other. In this section I will examine the interaction between using VAA 
and age and finally I will put voting preference into logistic regression with interaction 
between independent variables. 
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Graph 2. Voting preferences explained by the interaction between using VAA in different 
age groups.  
 
Graph 2 shows that older people who are also using VAA are more likely to change their 
vote intention than is the same case with younger people. This is total opposite what can 
be seen in theory. From theory I would have expected that young people who are also 
using VAAs should be more prone to change their vote as they are more easily influenced 
by different information sources, and as we already know, VAA is one of the competing 
information sources.  
As I have look at the blue line and analyse people who have not used VAA then their vote 
intention is less likely to change as the age increases. This goes also against the theory as 
I would have expected that young people in general are more prone to change their vote 
intention than older people.  
Still, one thing that catches the eye is the older generation and the difference between 
minimum and maximum value in probability to change the voting preference. The 
whisker, i.e. the gap between the upper and lower 95% confidence interval is worth 
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examination. In the beginning of the analysis it is clearly seen that there were less people 
representing the older generation. That means that the large gap can actually be explained 
by the fact that among VAA users there were few respondents who belong to age group 
65+. That means that each respondent’s answer has a bigger weight in changing the 
overall effect of VAA in the same age group. Also, it is possible to play with the idea that 
those people who belonged to older generation and were included in the research might 
be part of a tech-savvy group, which means that they are also prone to be affected by the 
VAA even if they belong to older generation.  
 
  
 41 
Results  
The aim of this master thesis was to contribute to opening up the world of VAAs and 
their effect on voters’ voting behaviour. VAAs have been around for quite a long time 
and become an essential part in making final voting decision for many people.  
In the beginning of this research I posed three questions: how voting advice applications 
influence turnout; how do VAAs change or affect voter’s choice set; and finally, how do 
VAAs influence the final vote choice. I used several logistic regression models and tested 
them on two datasets: panel data from European Parliament elections in 2014, and survey 
data on Estonian national elections in 2015.  
In next paragraphs I will give an overview of the results of my analysis and then continue 
with wider discussion of VAAs based on the results of my analysis.  
Effect on turnout 
The first research question I tackled was about turnout. Considering theory, rational 
choice theory should be one possible way of explaining that people go and vote. As using 
VAA is simple, quick and it presents comparable analysis for the user, it acts as an 
application where all necessary information is brought together. As using VAA is simple 
and it takes quite little time, the effort that a person has to give (compare it for example 
to reading parties’ manifestos and listening and/or watching TV or radio debates), 
decreases significantly. Based on that people should go and vote.  
Also, as we consider VAA as communicative tool, it may increase voters’ interest in 
politics and therefore also bring new people to participate in elections.  
As I conducted my research, I found that based on two datasets, panel data and survey 
data, VAA acts more like a control mechanism. That means that people who were going 
voting were also more eager to use VAA. Therefore, I can conclude that new people 
actually did not come to vote. This is an example of typical bottleneck theory that is used 
in explaining and analysing the effect of technology on people. As technology makes 
participating in elections easier, it should benefit those who are not very interested in 
politics by making voting choice easier and bringing them to vote. However, as those 
people who are not interested in politics, are also less exposed to such tools as VAA, there 
is a big probability that they have not even heard about such possibility. And therefore 
those who should benefit the most by it, are left aside.  
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Changing choice set 
The second section was devoted to see the effect of VAAs on voter’s choice set. As I 
have noted above several times, using the term ‘choice set’ here is not entirely correct. In 
terms of choice set I only had a look at if the positioning of a political party has changed. 
It means that in this case it did not matter whether the party’s position had increased or 
decreased. Also, I did not count in the extent of the change in positions.  
When we come back to theoretical framework then again, many possible explanations 
can be found to explain the change in choice set. One option would be, of course, rational 
choice theory as voting for some parties may be more useful from the perspective of voter 
and final electoral outcome. Also, VAAs act as communicative aspect, which means that 
based on the results of VAA and of course other possible communicative mediums that 
surround us, voter decides to change the list of parties that might get his/her vote, or 
simply re-evaluate the likelihood of voting for one or another party/candidate.  
The results of the second part of my thesis in a way reflect the ones from first chapter: 
people who used VAA did not really change their choice set, which can be interpreted 
again that VAA acts as a control mechanism. In the Estonian political party landscape 
only party that stood out in this case were conservatives. That means that if a person 
thinks s/he is a supporter of Conservative party (in Estonian EKRE), s/he might change 
that after taking VAA.  
Changing final vote choice 
The last empirical chapter was about changing the final vote choice. After the analysing 
the effect of VAAs on the actual vote change I can conclude that I saw some kind of 
negative effect, i.e. the vote preference is more likely to change if a person uses VAA. 
However, in statistical terms I cannot make a strong conclusion on that as almost all our 
independent variables were insignificant.  
As I put interest in politics and using VAA into interaction when predicting the change 
in vote choice, I saw that older people using VAA are more likely to change their voting 
preference. As we consider theory, it was quite unexpected. However, this can be 
explained by small number of respondents in older age groups, and also the fact that those 
respondents might belong to a certain group of people who are affected by the VAA even 
if they are older.  
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Discussion 
The final section before summary is devoted to discussion. In this section I will have a 
look at the results one more time and compare them with the theory and also try to think 
further on the effect of VAAs on voting behaviour. In this section I will also give an 
overview of the weaknesses of my analysis and their effect on outcomes. Final paragraphs 
of this section will be about suggesting some topics for further research on voting advice 
applications.  
The effect of voting advice applications on voting behaviour has been studied quite a lot, 
however, so much is yet to discover. My research was built on two datasets, panel data 
on European Parliament elections in 2014 and survey data on Estonian national elections 
in 2015. The strength of panel data is that it is possible to measure voting behaviour for 
the same people before and after the elections. This means that it opens up more on how 
people are affected by communication mediums, to which category VAAs certainly 
belong to.  
Survey data, however, was chosen because European Parliament elections tend to be more 
second category elections for Estonians. As it mentioned several times before in this 
thesis, the differences between turnouts in European Parliament and national elections 
are quite remarkable. Unfortunately, panel data has not been gathered for national 
elections. Main reason for that is most probably money as making such research is very 
expensive. However, from the perspective of academia and further research, it would be 
very interesting to see, what kind of results can be seen when analysing panel data on 
national elections in Estonia. The turnout in national elections has always been quite solid 
as I consider that in Estonia it is not compulsory to participate in elections.  
Trapped in bottleneck 
The fact that I study two different elections is one of the core ideas if I consider the result 
of the first part of my analysis, which is the effect of VAAs on turnout. I was especially 
interested in the effect of VAAs on European Parliament elections as according to theory 
VAAs should be like an educating tool for people. If I think back to theoretical part, then 
VAAs are considered as communicative tools. However, what distinguishes it from the 
rest of mediums like newspapers, news portals, TV debates, it actually does all the work 
for the voter: it asks questions on timely issues, it compares the stances of a person to the 
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ones of political party or candidate. After that, it shows comparison, which parties match 
people the most and which have less in common with the voter. Easy, isn’t it!? The word 
‘easy’ is especially important in this context as I think back to the rational choice theory: 
if it takes me such a small amount of time to do the VAA and get all the necessary 
information to form a vote choice, why not to go and vote?  
In the case of European Parliament elections, this theory did not seem to work. 
Respondents who already had the plan to go and vote were more prone to use VAA. If I 
step a bit back from it, then it can be questioned, if a person already knows who to vote 
for, why bother using VAA after all? One explanations to that can be that people were 
using VAA as a control mechanism and therefore the overall power of VAA to bring 
people to vote was not represented based on this dataset. Those people who are interested 
in politics anyway and who are more prone to use technology and such tools as VAA, 
were using it and therefore the overall aim of VAA was in a way defeated.  
If I consider that VAA did not appear to have a strong impact of making people go and 
vote, I can also say that this is a typical example of bottleneck theory. As noted already 
above in the analysis part, those people who are more exposed to technology can actually 
have less use out of VAA. Technology makes going voting (or voting, depending on 
context) easier and should make those who are not into politics, go and make a vote 
choice. Based on my analysis, however, it can be seen that people who should have most 
use out of VAA, were trapped in a bottleneck and therefore I could not see the effect of 
VAA on turnout.  
Changes in choice set 
The second part of my analysis was devoted to choice set, which, as seen and also 
mentioned before, is a bit arbitrary. I did not measure changes in choice set as such but 
more if the changes appeared. That means that if a person claimed that s/he has changed 
the likelihood of voting for, say, Reform Party, then it was enough for my analysis. I did 
not consider separately, if the result was that s/he is now supporting Reform Party more 
or less. Even though it can be counted as a weakness of my thesis, I claim that if there 
were some effects on the change in choice set I would have also investigated them further. 
However, based on my analysis the effect of VAA was there but it was statistically 
insignificant. Leaving that aside, I found that in the cases of Reform Party, Centre Party, 
Social Democrats, and Pro Patria and Res Publica Union, voters are less likely to change 
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their probability to cast a vote for that party. However, in the case of Conservatives (or 
EKRE, in Estonian), the effect of VAA on the probability to vote for that party was 
opposite. One reason for that may be that Conservatives are widely considered as 
populists in Estonian society and therefore it might come as a surprise for people who do 
VAA that they have way less (or more, as I did not distinguish increase or decrease in the 
probability to vote for that party) in common with EKRE as they initially thought.  
Not powerful enough 
The final section of this analysis was about final vote choice where I compared the vote 
intention to vote choice. I found that VAA has a positive effect on the change of vote 
choice, which means that those people who were using VAA, were also more likely to 
change the vote choice. There can be two explanations for this. Firstly, people saw that 
some other political parties/candidates have more close opinion to them in topics that the 
voter considers more relevant (for example health care, education, defence policy and so 
on). This, as seen in theory, refers to issue voting that is based on the latter idea. The other 
way can be, again, seeing the VAA as a communicative tool that was among those that 
finally helped to shape voter’s opinion. I say VAA was among communicative tools, as 
there was a gap between first and second wave of the survey and people get information 
from a wide variety of sources.  
In terms of VAA and its effect on final vote choice I would have expected according to 
theory that the effect is strong. If I look at the results of my analysis, then I definitely see 
the effect of VAAs, however, it is statistically insignificant. This is actually surprising 
especially as in that section I was studying panel data on European Parliament elections. 
The fact that in statistical terms I did not find anything in this section shows that the VAA 
was not that important tool for shaping people’s decision who to vote for.  
One of the possible critique points in this case can be that there were too few cases to 
base the analysis on. Even though I have claimed above that out of 1002 people 123 or 
every 10th used VAA, the number is very small to claim the effect of VAA. Especially 
as there were 29 respondents who said that s/he used VAA and did not go to vote. That 
number is very small if I want to compare the effect of VAAs on voting behaviour as I 
consider that there were 604 respondents who did not use VAA and went to vote and 272 
respondents who did not use VAA and also did not go to vote. I still claim that the effect 
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would have been present also in this case, so in my opinion it is quite safe to say that the 
effect of VAA on the respondents of that research is still weak.  
Suggestions for further research 
Based on this analysis and also my readings on VAAs, I would like to finish my thesis by 
offering a few ideas that can be considered when further studying VAAs and their effects 
on voting behaviour in the future.  
Firstly, even though it does not depend that much on a researcher or analyst, I think that 
it would be very important to have panel data also on national elections. Panel data, 
compared to simple survey data gives more opportunities to study the effect of VAAs 
even more as same people are questioned before and after elections.  
Secondly, I would also like to offer the idea of using different research methods to tackle 
the question of VAAs and their effect on voting behaviour. Besides quantitative methods 
it would be also interesting to study the same topic by using qualitative methods. One 
option would be letting people do the VAA and after that do focus group interview where 
they can discuss and open up about the results of the VAA and how they compare to their 
opinions and expectations. I find this especially interesting in the time of alternative facts 
and populism where people can be easily distracted by what they see and read in 
traditional, alternative, and also social media.  
Thirdly, I would propose the same idea I was once playing with myself: doing laboratory 
experiment and measuring how people’s opinions change in a small amount of time. 
Compared to panel data, there is a small time gap between answering questions before 
and after doing VAA, which means that the effect VAA alone is exposed way more than 
for example in this research.  
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Summary 
The aim of this master thesis was to analyse the effect of voting advice applications 
(VAAs) on voting behaviour. I was measuring the effect of VAAs on turnout, on choice 
set and on final vote choice. I was studying those questions based on two datasets: panel 
data on European Parliament elections in 2014 (for all three research questions) and 
simple survey data on national elections in 2015 (for turnout section).  
Statistically speaking, the results of my thesis were insignificant, however, based on my 
analysis I could show the typical effect of bottleneck to the turnout, also the fact that the 
effect of VAA actually depends on type of elections (European Parliament ones or 
national ones). However, the effect I got based on my analysis, was rather contradictory 
as I would have expected based on theory stronger effect on European Parliament 
elections.  
My analysis showed that VAAs do not have strong effect on changing the choice set. 
Also, there was positive effect on changing final vote choice, however, the effect was not 
that strong to consider it statistically significant. Therefore, I claim that the effect of VAA 
was not that strong based on that dataset as even with small number of cases it would 
have still appeared.  
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